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In the first part of the paper, we study the effect of immigration on local 
employment and welfare in a host country suffering from minimum wage un-
employment. We find the displacement ratio between local worker and foreign 
worker is one-to-one. In both Solow model and decentralized Ramsey model, 
illegal immigration is welfare-detrimental as the foreign workers lower the total 
expected income of the local; the rent from exploitation cannot cover the loss 
from unemployment when there is no compensatory raise on the wage income. 
In the second part, using a simple random search model, the effects of illegal 
immigration on the host country are examined. It is found that the goodness of 
the undocumented to the economy highly depends on the interplay between a 
negative productivity effect and a positive exploitation effect. Nevertheless, two 
different outcomes could be induced by the same type of migrants, depending 
the local labor market condition before immigration. Finally, we show that 
though various policy controls deter the immigration flow, it may worsen the 
labor market of the host country even when migrants may hurt the economy in 
the first place. 
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The issue of illegal immigration has long been contested. Though there are some 
studies indicating that immigration may improve the welfare of the receiving 
country (see Djajic, 1997; Razin & Sadka, 2000 from examples), citizens from 
the host countries usually fill with xenophobic sentiment. According to a poll 
conducted nationally by the Time magazine in 2006/ right before the rally in 
April 2006, 82 percent of the interviewees think the US government has not 
done enough to keep the exploited migrants out of their homeland. Indeed, 
since the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 
1986，the US government has endeavored to implement different measures, like 
border patrol and employer sanction, to keep the paperless labors out of the 
nation. Overall spending on enforcement climb from $1 billion US dollars in 
1985 to $4.9 billion US dollars in 2002.2 Still, the stock of the undocumented 
migrants have not landed. Though with a decreasing rate, the total population 
of illegal immigrants in the United States is ever increasing throughout the 1990s 
(U.S. INS, 2001). The estimate for the 1990 illegal population is 3.500 million; 
at 2000, the figure doubles to 7.000 million. The recent estimate of the total 
population of the illegality in the US even reaches 10.3 million (Passel, 2005), 
which accounts to about 3 per cent of the US population. 
‘Tumulty , K.，M. Al len, P. Bacon, M . Calabresi & M. Thompson (2006) Should they stay 
or should they go? Time, 167 (15), 30-40. 
^The figures is from the fact,sheet (Nov 2005, no. 10) of the Migrat ion Policy Institute. That 
is based on the US Depar tment of Justice Immigrat ion and Natural izat ion Service, Budget 
Requests to Congress, 1985-2002. 
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1.1 Characterizing Illegal Immigrants 
Economic studies devoted to irregular immigration are scant comparing with 
the attention received by the legal immigration. But it is commonly believed 
that undocumented workers are usually unproductive hence less productive. To 
my knowledge, there is no empirical study directly comparing the productivity 
difference between domestic and (legal) immigrated workers, for it is not easy 
to standardize the measure, or the data may suffer empirical problems like 
selection bias (Jasso Rosenzweig, 1990). Consequently, researchers tend to 
employ education as proxy to gauge the earnings between workers with various 
origins (Card, 2005). 
Though the positive self-selection hypothesis is well documented in the mi-
gration literature,3 studies also gin some supports on negative selection in re-
cent immigrants (Borjas, 1987; Constant & Massey, 2003; Hatton & Williamson, 
2004). These plausibly indicate that (legal) migrants are tends to be less ed-
ucative or less productive, so they on average earn less than the indigenes. 
National studies articulate such difference. Prom the census in 2000 and the 
Current Population Survey, Card (2005) and Smith (2006)，individually, find 
that immigrants on average have less year of schooling. In joint with Rivera-
Batiz (1999), which supports the belief that illegal immigrants are less educated 
than legal immigrants, assorted observations from the US seems conforming this 
common belief. 
Though we observe that illegal migrants on average earn less and at the same 
3 According to the hypothesis, workers who choose to emigrate are usually relatively skilled 
(see Gabriel & Schmitz, 1995 for example). 
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time less educated, there may exist another explaination to this phenomenon. 
It is not difficult to perceive that the rootless workers may be put into an 
unfavourable position in employment and hence underpaid. Some anecdotal 
evidence details the exploitation experienced by the rootless workers. While 
some "tourists" intentionally overstay and automatically become unauthorized 
workers, people from some nations are even do not have chance to overstay 
and are refused by the immigration departments at the airport. One possible 
method is to hire agents to prepare false documents. To smooth the process, 
the misfortune sometimes risk incurring debts to human-traffickers, or coyotes, 
to help them gain access to the host countries. For example, the Immigration 
Department in Hong Kong usually refuses to issue visa to Pakistani at the 
airport. So the alternative to them is to enter China with valid visas then come 
to Hong Kong by other means of transportation. In most cases, agents would 
take their passoports and force them to work in sweatshops to finance their trips 
(US State Department, 2006; Priebel & Guriev, 2006). 
A piece of empirical evidence on exploitation comes from Rivera-Batiz (1999). 
After controling for education, labor market experience, language skill and other 
individual characteristics, illegal immigrants do earn less. The Legalized Popu-
lation Survey (LPS) provides a source of data to moneterize the legal status of 
a worker. After undergoing the Blinder-Oaxaca wage docomposition, about 50 
per cent wage differential is unexplained by factors like education, labor mar-
ket experience. This indicates some degrees of labor market discrimination or 
exploitation against the illegal population. 
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In term of modelling, early theoretical investigations were much influenced by 
Ethier (1986). They usually incorporated enforcement policy into their analyses 
to distinguish illegal immigration. In his pioneering work, Either (1986) con-
cluded that border enforcement policy would probably reduce national income. 
However, when the host country employs a policy mix of both internal (e.g. 
employer sanction) and external (e.g. border patrol) enforcement, the welfare 
effect of the policies would depend on the information assumption regarding the 
type of workers that firms employ. Djajic (1987) develops a two-country model 
to inspect the various effects of external disturbances, such as a decrease in min-
imum wage of the home country, on the number of foreign labors present and 
unemployment through the dynamics and international transmission of immi-
gration policy. In general, the up-and-down of unemployment largely depends 
on the sensitivity of immigration policy to the change in the number of migrants 
found in the receiving country. Bond & Chen (1987) extends the work of Either 
(1986) by letting the authority choose the optimal level of enforcement to max-
imize the welfare of the labor-absorbing country. The penalty acts like a wage 
tax and the resulting income distribution hinges on the mobility of capital in 
the model. If the barrier to capital mobility is opened, capitals would escape 
from the tax by moving to the foreign country. The foreign labors in this case 
gain. When capital is immobile, foreign workers lose and foreign capitalists 
gain. Their model thus recommends that it is optimal for the receiving country 
penalizing illegal immigrants and allows capital export. 
While we may borrow the results from the immigration literature we could 
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define those forsaken as a group of low-skilled workers, or introduce immigration 
control to characterize undocumented migrants. To the best of my knowledge, 
there is little study probing to the employment position of the paperless work-
ers in modeling the effect of illegal immigration. The second part of this thesis 
quests for this possibility. Differed from Hazari & Sgro (2003)，in which the 
degree of exploitation is set exogenously, this thesis endogenizes the wage differ-
ential between native and foreign workers. Depending on the intial status of the 
labor market, the differential plays a significant role in determining the effect of 
irregular immigration. 
1.2 Job Displacement 
Perhaps the major source of discontent stems from the fear of job displacement. 
There is a widespread belief that migrants would take the jobs from the natives, 
even though some of the jobs are unwanted because it is dangerous, dirty and 
difficult (the so-called 3D-jobs). Priedberg k Hunt (1995) states that theoretical 
predictions on the impact of immigration depend on the model used and the as-
sumption behind the types of workers resided in the economy (see Carter (1999) 
for a model showing this kind of dependence). When taking both the price ef-
fect and the scale effect into account, migrants would lower the factor prices 
of its perfect substitute, raise the prices of their complement and bear an am-
biguous effect on their imperfect substitutes. So, in evaluating the displacement 
effect, it is essential to consider the substitutability between workers. Using the 
cross-section data to estimate the aggregate production relationship, Grossman 
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(1982) assesses the substitutability between natives and migrants, and finds the 
employment elasticity is about -0.10. His findings in general align with the 
traditional viewpoint that immigrants are substitute of native and foreign-born 
workers are complementary to capital (for example, Bond & Chen, 1987). 
If Grossman's result well approximates reality, we would expect little in-
crease in unemployment in aggregate analysis. Many empirical studies indeed 
find that immigration has only mild effect on unemployment. Similar result is 
also obtained by Card (2005). Using the data from a sample of the Decenniel 
Censuses in US, he finds that there is little evidence that (legal) immigrants 
have harmed the employment of the less educated. Though the inflow of low-
skilled migrants raises the relative supply of the unskilled workers sharply, it 
bears virtually no effect on the employment level and wage rate in the US labor 
market with the data in 1980 and in 2000. This happens due to the surge of 
labor demand rather than of the supply. The excess labors are mostly absorbed 
by the major migrant employers in agriculture, textiles and footwear industries. 
Labor market segmentation raises substitutability. Winegarden and Khor 
(1991) investigates the impact of undocumented immigration on youth and mi-
nority workers. In their simultaneous-equation model, they distinguished the 
difference between voluntary and involuntary unemployment and noted that 
only the involuntary one can support the job displacement hypothesis. They 
concluded that only a small displacement is detected in the US labor market: 
a 75 percent increase in the relative size of illegal immigrants is required to 
raise unemployment rate for white youth by 1 percent. Nevertheless, no signif-
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icant effect does the illegality bear on ethnic minorities and worker with little 
labor market experience, i.e. the most vulnerable groups in accordance with the 
traditional view. 
The issue of unemployment is also addressed in various theoretical studies. 
When unemployment is owing to the minimum wage consideration, the welfare 
conclution seems to be more positive. Both Djajic (1997) and Chesney et al 
(1999) obtained a positive conclusion that those rootless workers benefits local 
economy in their trade-theoretic models. 
Considering the problem in the light of the equilibrium unemployment model, 
Carter (1999) adopts the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) type efficiency wage model to 
highlight the effect of illegal immigration. The unauthorized immigrants in 
Carter (1999) distinguish themselves as repetitive migrants (see Chiswick, 1988). 
He reached the conclusion that the effect of illegal immigration depends on the 
stock of migrants in the receiving economy. This result is based on the fact that 
migrants are willing to accept a lower wage, and which amounts to the labor 
market sorting between two sectors. When the migrant cohort is relatively small 
in size, native workers are better off because they find it beneficial to quit their 
low-wage job and queue for a higher wage one. This voluntary wait unemploy-
ment is indeed common in two-sector efficiency wage literature represented by 
Bulow & Summers (1986). Though there is only one commodity in his model, 
it is two-sector in essence as in Bulow & Summers (1986) and Matusz (1994). 
Kondoh (2004) later on extends Carter's (1999) model by incorporating legal 
migrants into the economy. In contrast to Carter's rather positive conclusion, 
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his model shows that the government of the host country should exclude the 
irregular migrants but welcome the legal ones. Another equilibrium unemploy-
ment model is presented by Ortega (2000). His two-country search model shows 
that there exists multiple steady-state equilibria, which could be paretoranked, 
with migration-equilibrium dominating the no-migration one. 
While it is the quantity adjustment receives much of the attention, change in 
wage level should not be ignored.'' Literature armed with the full employment 
assumption may be regared as experirnents controling for (i.e. fixing) unemploy-
ment rate (see Hazari k Sgro, 2003; Moy k Yip, 2006 for examples), a simple 
analysis in the first part of this thesis can be seen as an investigation when 
it is employment executes all the adjustments. This arrangement effectively 
sets the upper-bound on the effect of illegal immigration on employment (see 
Ethier, 1986). Empirically, Grossman (1982) finds the increase in the number 
of immigrants have little effect on the wages of the local workers. As the supply 
of migrants raises by 1 percent, wage of the natives falls by only 0.02 percent. 
While the methodology behind Grossman's (1982) work is to estimate the elas-
ticity of substitution between different factors of production based on the data 
of the US labor market composition, Hanson et al (2002) recently offers an al-
ternative approach searching for the effect of illegal immigration on wage. They 
found that wages at the border economies are quite insensitive to the variation 
in border enforcement. Such relations then serve as an indirect evidence that 
illegal immigration from Mexico has little impact on the wages in the US border 
An empirical work offered by Hanson k. Spi l imbergo (1999) studies the reverse relation-
ship: how the wage change in the host country affect the flow of illegal immmigrat ion . 
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areas. 
In short, though there are theoretical considerations indicating the possi-
bility that irregular immigration raise employment, it remains empirically true 
that the alien workers adversely affect the general employment level and hurt 
the local labors. Nevertheless, it is always find that this effect is mild, though 
these cross-section probably could only provide a partial, short-run picture of 
the reality. 
In the following part, we extend the Hazari & Sgro (2003) model by incor-
porating the possibility of minimum wage unemployment. The effect of illegal 
immigration on domestic unemployment and long-run welfare are considered. 
This cursory analysis on employment can be viewed as to identify the upper 
bound level of unemployment (quantity adjustment) that illegal migrant bourn 
on the receiving economy, in contrast to the wage adjustment analysis presented 
by the full employment literature. Employed the equilibrium unemployment 
model, the second part then depicts a more realistic picture in which both wage 
and employment would absorb the shock. Two different approaches are adopted 
to differentiate illegal migrants from the indigenes. Within the same model, the 
effect of various immigration controls are also examined. 
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2 Min imum Wage Unemployment 
This section revisits the works of Hazari & Sgro (2003) and Moy & Yip (2006) 
when there is unemployment. In evaluating the issue of illegal immigration, 
economists' objective is on the long-run welfare effect as there are usually some 
losers in every structural change; Pareto improvement seems desperately impos-
sible. Yet the society in generally is still better off if the overall welfare advances. 
The analysis in this part bridges two lines of researches, the welfare analysis of-
fered by Hazari & Sgro (2003) and the effect of immigration on unemployment 
given by Carter (1999). Illegal migrants are characterized as a group of work-
ers willing to accept a wage rate which is lower than that of natives though 
both are identically productive. As a result, firms in the host country could 
exploit the foreign workers. In the Ramsey setting, Hazari & Sgro (2003) find 
that, when migrants are perfect substitute in production, the exploitation effect 
alone lowers domestic consumption as migrants successively enter the economy. 
When taking the indirect intertemporal effect into account, Moy & Yip (2006) 
conclude that the welfare effect is indeed ambiguous. 
The conclusion they drawn is based on the assumptions that illegal immi-
grants have no impact on the domestic labor market which is always clear. The 
analysis in this part relaxes the premise and re-examines the issue when there 
is minimum wage unemployment. Another important difference is that we solve 
for the competitive equilibrium rather than the planner's solution. As shown in 
Palivos (2006), firms do earn profit in hiring undocumented workers. Such rent 
however is not captured in the planner's solution. Nevertheless, we also mod-
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ify the budget constraint to accommodate the unemployment scenario. Along 
their lines, we shall assume that the labor input of migrant is homogenous in 
production and migrants are identically productive. 
2.1 The Basic Model 
There are L (local) residences and M illegal immigrants in the economy. U 
of which are unemployed due to the minimum wage, which is set above the 
market clearing level. Assuming information is perfect, firms can easily locate 
migrants and hire them.''' As migrants are willing to accept a lower wage and 
they are perfect substitute of the native worker, those unemployed are primarily 
indigenes. Denoting E the number of the employed residences The production 
function subsequently is 
Y = F[K,E + M]. 
Let capital per worker be 
(1) 
where N = E + M \s the number of employed worker, including migrants. 
It follows that y = ^二 , , , and the constant returns to scale property implies 
y = f{k). 
The number of illegal migrant and the wages of migrants are exogenous. 
Given the legal status of the undocumented workers, firms may want to take 
5 We shall relax this assumption in next chapter, in which unemployment is generated by 
search friction. 
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this advantage to earn some rent by paying them less. Apart from the evidence 
that we have mentioned in the introduction, Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark (2002) 
employs the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data to control 
for the over-time macroeconomic fluctuation in the LPS data, their panel data 
analysis also finds evidence of exploitation. Let /3 be the exploitation factor 
which is less than one. The firm's problem is, 
max FlK,E + M]-rK-wE- jSwM (2) 
The first order conditions with respect to K and E are 
U,< 二 Fk - r (TjJ) = 0 (3) 
Hfj = Fn - w = 0. (4) 
As wage is exogenously given, from (4)，we solve for the the capital per worker 
k. Assuming there exists some form of capital demand and supply functions, 
and the capital market is cleared, we would be able to solve for the labor demand 
of the firm. Write (4) in form of the labor demand function, 
N') {w) = E + M (5) 
with N' < 0. Labor supply is inelastic, thus 
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NS = L + M. (6) 
Suppose minimum wage level is set before migration exists, such that unem-
ployment already prevails before immigration. 
At w, unemployment is the difference between labor supply and labor de-
mand, 
U = NS - ND 例 = L + M - N') (w). (7) 
Since w is exogenously set by government, N、(w) is simply a constant inde-
pendent of M as we assume government does not response to the immigration 
problem. In the later section, it is more convenient to work with employment 
level E rather than unemployment U. Rewrite (7), 
E = N'^ {w) - M (8) 
while E = L — U. Differentiating (8) with respect to M yields 
盒 = (9) 
Proposition 1 In an economy with minimum wage unemployment, when illegal 
immigrants are perfect substitute of the local workers, the effect of immigration 
on unemployment is in a ratio of one-to-one, with no effect on the local wage 
level. 
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Note that in our model, we have a non-segmented labor market, thus the 
excess labor may not be absolved by other sectors in the economy. In a study 
of how the economic migrants influences the relative supply of the low skilled 
workers in the receiving country, Card (2005) finds that each new immigrant 
adds about 1 worker to the net supply of low skilled workers in a US city 
when he compares the data in 1980 and 2000. Nevertheless, this one-to-one 
conclusion may be overstated in a static-migration model. Illegal immigrants 
usually are repeat migrants who undertake multiple trips across border during 
their lifetimes (Chiswick, 1988). Ignoring the dynamics of immigration inflow 
and outflow probably exaggerates the effect of immigration (Angelucci, 2005). 
Inflow of migrants effectively raises total labor supply in the economy and 
drives down the equilibrium wage further from the enforced wage. As the equi-
librium wage is less than ItJ, the minimum wage law prevails and still in effect 
(See 1). While the inflow does not affect the behavior of firms, as shown clear 
in the firm's maximization problem, firm still employ labors according to their 
marginal product. So the labor demand does not change no matter how many 
unjustly-paid labors present in the economy. The only difference is that firms 
now earn non-zero profit. 
2.2 The Effect of Illegal Immigration 
Though undocumented immigrants would draw part of the income from the 
host economy, they also contribute in production with a lower wage. As shown 
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Figure 1: Change in Labor Supply After Immigration 
be worthwhile to reconsider the welfare issue in the long run equilibrium of the 
economy. 
2.2.1 The Solow Model 
Unemployment may affect households' behaviors as only a faction of the house-
hold could find jobs. In the following sections, emphasis would be placed on the 
long run equilibrium of a decentralized economy. 
What the whole economy invests is a constant fraction s of the income net 
of depreciation. 
K = sY- SK (10) 
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In a decentralized economy, the income of the residents is the sum of the 
wage bill from the employed workers, rental rate and profit from exploiting 
illegal migrants, 
二 TiJE + + n. (11) 
As migrants only invest in activities beyond the border, rental collected 
from lending out capital and profit share are all entitled to native citizens only. 
Consequently, only domestic residences face the allocation problem. 
From (2), 
F[K,E + M]- rK -wE- pwM. (12) 
As we assume the production function is constant returns to scale, recall 
that iV = 丑 + M , by the Euler theorem, 
F{K,E + M) = FkK + Fyv (JS + M) 
=rK + + wM. (13) 
The last equality is owing to the first order condition. Substitute (13) into 
(12)，and divide the whole expression by L, 
^ = { l - f 3 ) w f . (14) 
Divide (11) by the native population L of the economy and substitute (14) 
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in, 
V = wE + rK + n 
Y E K E + M 。、 M 
— = w — — h / ' + (1 - B)w一 
L L J E + M L 卞 、 P I L 
L = 1 J + - Z — ( 1 5 ) 
The last equality makes use of firm's first order conditions and in the in-
tensive forms. This equation says that the income of household is a part of 
the total output net of the income taken by migrants. Total differentiate (1), 
assume away population growth and immigration flow, 
k _ K_E+M 
k ^ K~E+M 
k - ^k A: - K ^ 
一 K K 
= K E + M 
= ( 1 6 ) 
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Divide (10) by L, and make use of (16), 
K Y K 
— = s d — 
L L L 
k{E + M) Y K 
— L — = 
k = (17) 
Further put (15) in (17), make use of (8), E = N — M, 
k = s 迈 ( W ; 师 ) - S k (18) 
At the steady state, 
s w + k*f' - 5k* = 0. (19) 
To see the effect of illegal immigration on the steady state capital per worker, 
total differentiating (19) yields,® 
dk* _ spw 
dM = N{sf' + skr-6) < u. 网 
To see the sign of (20)，rearrange (19) to get 
. s 「 一 fN-l3M\ ] 
Substituting this back to the denominator of (20) would find 
6 As h and M are the only endogenous variables in the expression, (20) includes both direct 
and indirect effects of M ( M bears no effect on N). 
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dk* I3wk* < 0 
Proposition 2 Though the static effect is zero 二 0」，the dynamic effect is 
non-neligible as the inflow of migrant affects the income of the domestic workers. 
Under the static case, the capital per worker is solely firm's problem. But af-
ter considering the long-run dynamic and bringing households into the analysis, 
the capital per worker depends also on the employment rate and rent extracted 
from exploitating the migrants. So, there are two reasons why we draw different 
conclusions on the change in k. Firstly, we define capital per worker differently. 
Secondly, we brought in the income of household into the picture and by doing 
so, we identify the income effect which is absent in firm's maximization prob-
lem. Also note that the employment depends only on the wage rate specified by 
the government. When the total capital stock declines as a result of the invest-
ment ebb, this transfers totally to the drop of capital per worker. Therefore, 
the change in capital per worker is all owing to the change in capital but not 
employment level. 
As illustrated in 2’ after immigration, the per resident income goes down as 
the rent earned does not sufficiently cover the loss generated from unemploy-
ment. If we further decompose the income of the economy, the wage income is 
wN, but afterwards it becomes wE. wE — wN = -Mw. From (14), the profit 
is equal to (1 - P) Mw. The net change of total income is -M^w, which is a 




Figure 2: The Effect of Immigration on Steady State Capital per Worker 
illegal immigration. 
All steady-state variables are in fixed proportion in the Solow model. As 
sy* = 6k*, from (19), 
(N -BM\ ,,, …、 
y = ) + k f . (21) 
Since C = (1 - s) y , defining c = £ consumption per local residence. 
c={\-s)y^ (22) 
Prom (20)，(21), and (22)， 
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dy dy dk dy 
而 = + (23) 
dc , \ dy N ,, 、df 
——=(1 _ s ) — — — + (1 - s) y — ^ 
dM ^ � M L 卞、 ” d M 
= 芸 盖 T < 。 （24) 
At steady state, capital per worker, output and consumption per residence 
would all decrease. Illegal immigrants hurts the host country. It is because 
household's expected income decreases, more of them lose their jobs while their 
wage rate does not increase as the illegals come in. While the saving rate does 
not response to the income change, their consumption must go down with their 
income. This makes the investment of the economy less in the steady state. 
2.2.2 The Decentralized Ramsey Model 
The budget constraint of the local residence is, 
K = Y-C-SK. (25) 
This looks very similar (10) in the Solow model. Again, divide (25) by L 
and substitute (11) for Y in (25). Using the same expression from the Solow 
model, that is, (15) for 爸 and (16) for 爸.Note that we still define k = - ^ ^ ； 
the K attached to 6 in (10) would become k after steps of substitution as shown 
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in the derivation of (17). Inspecting (18) would easily find that both equations 
are similar. 
k ^ ^ ^ ^ m ^ r k - S k - ^ (26) 
The domestic household problem is 
POO 
max / e-P^U ( q ) dt 
ct Jo 
subject to (26). 
The first order conditions are 
Ne-P^U' = A 
- A (r - 6) = A 
The optimal consumption path is given by 
，二 [r — p — (J] (27) 
where a = is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Note that 
E + M = N {w) by (7) and k = in equilibrium. Change in M does not 
affect E + M hy proposition 1 (i.e. ^ = 0). Though the interest rate does not 
enter the individual budget constraint, in contrary to the planner's solution, in 
equilibrium, r = f'. 
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At the steady state, 
f ' - p - 6 = 0 (28) 
< ¥ 、 七 kf-Sk-* = 0 (29) 
To check the local stability, linearize the system 
/ \ / \ / \ 
c 0 / " I c - c * 
U j U / ' “ 八 
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is 
f" 
det = i < 0 
It is negative if we assumed it is saddle path stable.了 Total differentiate the 
system, 
/ \ / \ / \ 
0 / " 11 dc ] 0 
= dM 
U v ^ w ⑷ 
Solve it to yield, 
盖 = • < 。 _ 
7 In case of the Cobb-Douglas production technology. The determinant is 





Figure 3: Competitive Equilibrium 
S h 。 （31) 
Note that though illegal immigration does not bear any static effect on the 
capital per worker, as the expected income goes down, steady state level's capital 
per worker would decrease as spell out by the Solow model. Diagrammatically, 
note that illegal immigration only shifts. The k = 0 locus. From (29), c is 
decreasing in M , this means the k = Q locus shrinks. Consumption jumps 
instantly from point A to point B upon immigration. 
Proposition 3 At the steady state, consumption per head decreases. Illegal 
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immigrants hurts the host country. 
Certainly, the model bears some features that would not be able to fully re-
flect what happens in reality. For instances, we assume unemployment is totally 
out of wage rigidity, and the total employment would not adjust accordingly; 
though when the number of job is fixed, it is possible that immigration is welfare 
enhancing. In the long run growth model, such rigidity does not die out and 
persistently affects the labor market of the economy. Second limitation comes 
from the one-sector setup. In a two-sector case, the reduction of production 
costs may drive the factors from the other sector and raises the number of job. 
Nevertheless, Card's (2005) study shows thast there is little evidence that the 
Hecksher-Ohlin style effect matters; change in industrial structure account for 
only a small share of absorption in migrant densely populated cities, like Los 
Angeles, over the past two decades. The adjustment is more inclined to the 
within industries one. Finally, we have assume illegal migrants are perfect sub-
stitute of the local labors. If there are two types of labor present in the host 
country, the unskilled labor is possibly complementary to the skilled one (Ven-
turini, 1999), and balloons employment for the skilled. In the coming part, we 
are going to scrutinize the issue in an environment free from either employment 
or wage rigidity. 
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3 Frictional Unemployment 
In the previous section, virtually every variable is fixed. Every (potential) worker 
is endowed with one unit of labor and supplies it inelastically. Labor demand is 
given by firm's first order conditions (the supply of the illegality does not distort 
firm's decisions by the perfect substitute assumption). As the increased supply 
of workers only pushes the new equilibrium wage further from the enforced wage 
level, the rigid wage is still at work and the economy wide employment level is 
fixated by this wage level. An assumption behind last chapter's investigation is 
that the number of firm is constant and firms earn rents from hiring a cohort of 
exogenous given undocumented workers at an imposed fixed wage. But aggre-
gate labor demand is not fixed in reality and new firms will enter the market 
to extract profit. Thus the inflow of migrant would induce a "derived" labor 
demand. 
This part re-examines the issue by taking this possibility into account but 
still assumes the aggregate labor supply of two classes of perfectly substitutable 
workers is exogenous and inelastic in an economy where there is frictional un-
employment. In evaluating the welfare effect of illegal immigration, one line 
of debate hinges on the demand side of the labor market. While migrants 
very likely are the potential competitors, the number of job is not fixed. The 
search model developed by Diamond (1982) ideally models this kind of flexibil-
ity present in the labor market. In a search economy, positive search externality 
may relax the tightness of the local labor market, for firms would open up more 
vacancies in response to the inflow of migrants (Ortega, 2000; Gauiter, 2002)， 
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this serves to raise local workers' chances of being employed. 
Even the number of job is fixed, when migrants are scattered around the 
country, from the host country's perspectives, native employers could also be 
benefited from hiring labors with a lower wage rate. Native workers in the 
secondary sector could be advantageous as poor jobs are primarily sorted to 
migrants (Carter, 1999); those thoughtful indigenes might deliberately give up 
their low-paid jobs and head for the remunerative ones in the expense of short-
term unemployment. 
Using the search framework developed by Diamond (1982) and Pissarides 
(2000), among others, we show that the associated impact of illegal immigration 
upon the labor market of the host country depends on the productivity and 
reservation wage of the migrants. When migrants are primarily substitute, the 
effect could run in either ways. As in Ortega (2000), migrants could be good 
to the economy due to positive externality, but "bad" migrants could bring 
negative impact. In contrast to Carter (1999)，the result here is independent 
of the number of migrant already in the country. Furthermore, immigration 
control may hurt the economy even when migrants are "bad". 
3.1 The Basic Model 
Unemployment is present in a search economy with only firms and workers. The 
searching process is two-sided. Labor market friction is summarized by a con-
stant returns to scale matching function m{U, V). U and V are respectively the 
number of unemployed native workers {N) and job vacancies in the marketplace. 
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As it is only density matter in the matching process, we define 9 = ^ as the 
tightness of the labor market. With the constant returns to scale property, we 
rewrite firms' hiring rate = m l ) as q{d)\ and workers' job arrival 
rate 岩 = ^ y as 6q (0).® All players share the common discount factor p and 
face an exogenous shock s that splits the match. 
The superscript (AT for native and M for migrant) denotes the status of 
workers to which the value referring. Let i = N,M denote the nationality of 
the worker, V the value of a vacancy and J^ the value of the job where worker 
i occupies; both variables are firm-specific. Call S" the value of worker i gain 
when he is actively searching for job (unemployed) and VP the value of the work 
to worker i. Comparing with V and VF*, 5", and W^ are worker-specific. 
Suppose that each firm incurs a fixed cost c per unit of time during recruit-
ment. Once the firm hires a worker, the party produces x* unit of output and 
pays in exchange of the services. For simplicity, let us first focus on what 
happens when there is only native worker. Above information allows us to write 
the pair of asset equations for firms as 
pV = - c + g(0) {J^-V) (32) 
pjN -w^ +s(V - J ^ ) . (33) 
^This constant, returns to scale property gains many empirical supports in various regions: 
Layard, Nickell and Jack inan (1991) for the United Kingdom; Berman (1997) for the United 
States; Fevc and Langot (1996) for Francc and Gross (1997) for Germany. In a theoretical 
model which friction arises cndogenously, Lagos (2000) shows the aggregated match ing func-
tion also exhibits constant returns to scale (see Petrongolo k, Pissaridcs (2001) for a more 
rcccnt and extensive review). 
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Similarly, each worker receives a stream of income 6' during his search, this 
could be the unemployment benefit net of the search effort, or the leisure enjoyed 
by the idle. Native workers' asset equations thus are 
pS^ +9q {6) {W^ - S^) (34) 
p W ^ ^ w ^ + s {S ^ - H^。• (35) 
The equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the pair of variables w^ 
and 9, which respectively denote the wage of native workers and tightness of 
the labor market when migrants are absent in the economy. Assuming wage is 
determined by the Nash bargaining 
w " = arg max - _ lO)—卢. 
with /3 denoting the bargaining power of the worker. The Nash bargaining 
solution gives us 
(1 - 13) (Vl/^ =/? [JN - V). (36) 
To find the equilibrium wage of worker, suppose there is free-entry in the 
industry, so V = 0. Imposing this into (32) and (33) gives us 
JN 二去、 (37) 
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JN = ^ _ _！ i - . (38) 
P + S 
Equalizing yield us the job creation condition, 
„ _ 榮 = 0 (39) 
To solve for market tightness, rearrange (35) such that, 
p + s 
Substitute (38) and the above equation into the Nash bargaining solution 
(36) to have 
八 = � x " + (l — ( 4 0 ) 
To solve for put (37) into (36) and the resulting expression back into 
(34) to get 
一 pj 
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Figure 4: Labour Market Equilibrium 
The equilibrium wage for the natives and the market tightness are given by 
the simultaneous equations (39) and (41). For clarity, it is worthwhile to give a 
graphical representation of these two equations. 
Equilibrium unemployment can be solved easily. Note that the unemploy-
ment flow is simply the net change of job gain and job loss, 
u = s{N-u)-eq{e)u 
where N is the total population of the local citizens. Stationary unemploy-
ment entails 
u = - = — ^ ^ . (42) 






Figure 5: Beveridge Curve and Unemployment 
(42) is the famous Beveridge curve. Given the definition of the market tight-
ness, 9y the equation specifies the relationship between unemployment and job 
vacancy. It is clear that the the Beveridge curve is downward sloping With the 
equilibrium market tightness, we may find the corresponding level of unemploy-
ment using the job creation condition (39) and the Beveridge curve (42) (see 
Figure 4). 
3.1.1 The Economy with Illegal Migrants 
Inevitable the flow appears, like Carter (1999), we take the inflow of migrants 
as exogenous. Residences and migrants are identical in every aspect except in 
their reservation wage 6* and productivity xV The variation may be due to 
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the country-specific human-capital difference (example includes language dif- • 
ference). Suppose migrant produces = . When i] = 1, both types of 
workers are equally productive. 
Survey data supports the premise that exploited immigrants are less edu-
cated or relative unskilled than natives. Prom the 2000 Census, 46.2 percent 
of natives received some college education or above, comparing with 37.9 per-
cent for (legal) immigrants (Card, 2005). Prom the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), schooling disparity of the foreign-born, whose age is 25 or above in 
2002，is about 1 year less than the natives (Smith, 2006). While it is the norm 
in the US for the children to finish the high school (12 years of education),® the 
number of year of schooling for the first generation immigrants born in 1970-
1974 is about 9.95 for Hispanic and 9.28 for Mexican (Smith, 2006). Regarding 
the education discrepancy between the legal and the illegal, a random sample 
from the 1989 Legalized Population Survey (LPS) shows that 33.6 percent of 
the male illegal migrants who granted amnesty received less than 6 years of 
schooling, versus 20.7 percent for legal migrants, whereas 25.4 percent among 
the undocumented obtained 10 or more years of schooling, versus 38.5 for legal 
migrants (Rivera-Batiz, 1999). In this part, we will make use of this feature to 
characterizing illegal migrant in the initial investigation. 
Let also b^' = tpb^, such that unauthorized workers have lower reserva-
tion wage (Bailey, 1985). There is only one type of job and firms incur the 
" i n 2003, 84.6 per cent of the populat ion , who is aged 25 or above, finish high school (US 
Census Bureau, 2004). Even for the remaining 15.4 per cent received zero year of education, 
and all 84.6 percent only receives 12 years of education, the mean number of year of schooling 
is 10.15. 
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same cost c in opening position during recruitment. In other words, vacancy 
is non-discriminative and the job requires same type of equipment during pro-
duction. So, the labor market is pooled; native and the undocumented workers 
compete for the same position and share the same matching function. Match-
ing is random. And it depends on the proportion of the unemployed in the 
market. Thus, a = = = jv+M" Though everything is non-
discriminative, upon meeting and wage negotiation, firms may discern the type 
of workers. This effectively allows firms pay discriminative wage according to 
workers' fundamentals although bargaining is independent thus not changing 
the threat points of each party. For simplicity, both types of worker have the 
same bargaining power ^ and separation rate s. Wi th the introduction of the 
new workers, we would like to see how the new equilibrium deviates from the 
migrant-free one. We are now going to find the new wage equation and job 
creation condition after the change. 
Firms gains a different value when they employ a migrant, but the value of 
an empty post is the same (vacancy is non-discriminative). So 
pj"' ^x"' -w'' +s{V-J'"). (43) 
Migrants' asset equations are parallel with those of native, i.e. (34) and (35). 
Make use of the result in the previous section, by symmetry, the wage equa-
tions for the native and the undocumented are simply 
w^ = {1 - + p {x^ + Be) (44) 
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wM = (1 - /3) bM + P (x '^^  + Oc). (45) 
Note that 6 = 口 ; n o w is the tightness of the pooled labor market with 
two types of workers, including the cohort of the unauthorized labors. 
Even they possess similar bargaining power, due to their productivity and 
outside payments differences, the wage differential is non-zero. Deducing (45) 
from (44) gives us 
wN 一 w^^ = (1-/3) bN (1 一 (^) + l3a:N (1 一 77) • (46) 
Firms are ignorant in search. Consequently, they open up positions according 
to their information on the number of migrants present in the host economy, 
which is known to each firm by assumption. Define expected value of a filled 
position as the weighted sum of the values for each type of jobs, using (38)，and 
with free-entry, we have 
r = OtjN + (1 一 … J M 
= 1 (1 一 … 一 切 M ) , ( 句 
p + s p + s 
Use (46) to simplify (47), 
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je = 工 N { " + ( 1 - 7 7 ) + + ( l - y Q ( l - g ) {1-I3)-W^ 
p + s 
= ^ (48) 
p + s 
where tx = x'^ {t] + {1 - rj) [a (1 - /3) + (1 - cp) (1 - a) (1 一 /3), which 
may be interpreted as expected output plus rent acquired from hiring migrants. 
In the pooled labor market, the value of the vacant position is, 
p v = - c + q { e ) { r - v ) (49) 
With free-entry, using the above equation, we derive the new job creation 
condition comparable to (39)， 
… t 赞 二 _ 
(50) and (44) co-determine w ^ and $. With (46), w'^' is also determined. 
3.2 Productivity Effect 
To see how the inflow of migrant affects the labor market of the host country, 
we could inspect the position of the job creation and hence the equilibrium wage 
rate and tightness. From (50), for every if tt < both the job creation 
equation and wage curve shift down comparing to the migrant-free situation 
described by (39). Both w ^ and 6 decrease in this case. The curve shifts up 
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and the whole thing reverses if tt > x^ . To see when there is a shift, we could 
decompose the expected profit into two terms. 
7r = x ^ { ; 7 + ( l - r / ) [a{l-l3) + P]} + b'' (1 - (1 - a) (1 -/3) | (51) 
、 V ‘ 、 ‘ 
output efTect reservation wage effect 
In case of v? = 1, (i.e. = b凡')and t? = 1 (i.e. x^ = x^^), n = x^ ; job 
creation curve remains unchanged. This is identical to the equilibrium in which 
there is no migrants. Since only the tightness will disturb the equilibrium, the 
sole change in the supply of homogenous labour will not affect the equilibrium. 
The output effect represents the relative cost of posting a vacancy. Suppose 
bN = b"' but x^^ < x^ . x^ {77 + (1 - v) [a( l-/3) + i0]} < x'^, job creation 
curve necessarily shifts down. With less productive migrant, for the same cost 
of posting a vacancy and the same power in wage bargaining, migrant gives a 
lower value to the same position. Therefore less vacancies are created. Illegal 
immigration hurts both native workers and firms. Smaller the productivity gap 
is, smaller the drop. More migrant in, larger the drop. 
Reservation wage effect captures the relative benefit gained by opening a po-
sition: Suppose Tj = 1, so that both types of workers are identically productive. 
TT > 1 with < 1. Migrant, in this case, is relatively economical to hire. This 
shifts the job creation condition up. With similar productivity, migrant is less 
expensive to hire. Hence more vacancies are created in equilibrium. 
Both effects are deepened as more migrants scramble in the economy (i.e. 
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Q； decreases). However, as migrants are able to produce rj, the productivity 
effect only happens at the margin of 1 — 77. As more migrants flow in, both 
the productivity effect and the exploitation effect accent but at different rates 
whenever r\ • ip. 
3.2.1 Comparative Statics 
To recap, the wage equation and job creation condition are, 
wN 二 {} 一 j3)bN + 3 (x^ + Qc) 
N c ( p + s) 
Both equations simultaneously determine wage rate and market tightness of 
the economy in equilibrium. 
Total differentiate with respect to w^, 9 and a, 
dwN = /3c de 
dwN = (1 - /3) [x^ { 1 - v ) - b N (1 - ⑷ ] d a + [c、P 没 de. 
Note x ^ (1 - 1]) - (1 - V?) is simply Ax — A6. To see the effect of the 
immigration tide, 
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dwN =冷 ( 1 一/?) (Ax-A6 )g ^ {9) 
doc ~ {e)-{p + s)q'{e) ^ ^ 
Notice that a is the proportion of the native population. By the property of 
the matching function q' (0) < 0. Therefore ^ ^ > 0 as long as Ax - A6 > 0. 
(52) says that, as long as the local workers outperform migrants (local work-
ers' productivity outweighed their extra claim), influx of migrants will hurt the 
natives by lowering their wage rate. Defining bad migrants as those with funda-
mentals Ax — Ab > 0 comparing with the native, from (46), the wage differential 
of migrants is fixed, so bad migrants not only lower local wage rate but also the 
wage that the subsequent migrants sneak in to receive. 
Again, if Ax - Ab> 0, 
^ = il-P)iAx-Ab) > 0 (53) 
c P qHo) 
Nevertheless, like the case of bad migrants tighten the market by lower-
ing 6. Since the mean duration of a vacant job is 1/q (6) and of unemployment 
is l/9q {9), differentiating with respect to 6, bad migrants shorten the time 
for firms to fill up the job but lengthen the average unemployment period for 
every worker, given the magnitude of the elasticity of the matching function 
£ {9) = is bound in the (0,1) interval. Many empirical evidences sup-
port the finding that the matching function is indeed inelastic and ranging from 
0.5-0.7 (Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001). 
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3.2 .2 Unemployment 
What is the effect of illegal immigration on domestic unemployment? Suppose 
migrants does not affect the market tightness 9, but from (42), with the presence 
of migrants, the base of unemployment rate changes. Would that affect the local 
unemployment rate even though 6 is unchanged? To check this, let U ^ be the 
pre-immigration level of unemployment, using (42) 
TJN S 
、…N 6q {9) + s 
Similarly, after immigration, 
M'、— UN + UM S 
“"、卜 N + M — e'q {B')+s' 
Suppose u = 7u (0), u' < 0. Combining to yield 
U^ _ U^ + IJM 
“了 = N+M 
DN = -aU. (54) 
7 
In terms of the direction of change, by simply inspecting the change of direc-
tion of 9, we are able to draw conclusion on the effect of immigration on domestic 
unemployment. Prom Figure 3, it is only the job creation condition shifts in re-
sponse to the migration flow. Wage and tightness necessarily move in the same 
direction. As the Beveridge curve will remain unchanged in its position, the 
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productivity effect unambiguously either hurts or benefits the economy: either 
more natives are employed with higher wage, or less local citizens working with 
lower wage. There is no trade-off between unemployment and wage rate. 
Qualitatively, if 0 = x = 1- U^ = aU, which is consistent with our 
randomness assumption and verifies that unemployment rate does not change if 
tightness remains the same. If, however, 9 > 9' (less post-immigration vacancy 
is created), u (9) < u or x > 1- The local unemployment population after 
immigration is lower than the proportional increase which it should be. The 
randomness element breaks down. Though unproductive migrants raise the 
number of unemployed domestic workers, but the size is less than proportion, 
thus the local unemployment rate decreases. Local residences face a trade-ofF 
between local unemployment rate and domestic wage rate. 
3.3 Exploitation Effect 
The characteristics of illegal migrants in the last section is general enough and 
may interpret as two groups of worker coexist in an economy, for example, 
skilled and unskilled workers with different reservation wage or value of leisure. 
Another way to distinct migrants from natives is to presume they have different 
powers in wage bargaining rather than different reservation wage. This is pinned 
down by the exploitation postulate in the minimum wage section of this thesis. 
(45) can be rewritten as 
w八'=(1 - 7) bM + 7 (x^'' + dc)； 
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where we replace fi with 7. It would be natural to assume that migrants 
possess weaker power than domestic workers, i.e. 7 = C e (0,1). At this 
stage, for brevity, we only illustrate the sole effect given by the various bargain-
ing power assumption, let x^' = x^ and = b^'. The wage differential, (46), 
becomes 
Atf； = /3 (1 - C) (x^ -b" + &c). 
Note that the wage differential now, rather than fixed, depends on the equi-
librium market tightness 0. The implied job creation condition is 
x^ + (1 - a) A w - w " " - c(::、s) = 0. (55) 
没） 
Comparing with (50), firm now earns a markup of (1 - a) Aw, which is 
increasing in G. By the property of the matching function, the job creation 
condition is still decreasing, but it does not shift parallelly due to the markup 
(see Figure 5). With a group of workers whom the firm could capture a larger 
share of surplus, firm would open up more positions hoping to meet one of these 
workers, thus easing the market. An other feature is that the new job creation 
condition or labor demand curve steps downward more slowly. With a larger 
wage differential, the average wage drops more sharply and make the average 
worker more economical to hire. 
Rather than letting heterogeneity root in productivity and reservation wage 






Figure 6: Job Creation Conditions With Various Degrees of Bargaining Power 
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their legal status. This modelling approach leads us to a scenario where migrants 
are unskilled and weak in bargaining due to their legal status, which we had 
discussed throughoutly in the introduction. 
In the last section, we noted that the job creation condition may shift down 
when the expected output drops below its pre-immigration level. Above alter-
native modelling approach leads us to an interesting case where the migrant-free 
job creation condition would intersect the post-immigration one. This suggests 
that the labor market condition before immigration plays a role in determining 
the effect of immigration. Recall that the productivity effect shifts the job cre-
ation condition down parallelly while the new exploitation effect due to weak 
bargaining position shifts and pivots the curve upward at the same time, within 
some parameter values, intersection happens around the equilibrium before the 
change, as shown in Figure 6. 
From (41), the slope of the wage curve not only depends on the bargain-
ing power of the residences, which is more or less rather stable, but also on 
the unit-cost of posting a vacancy. With relative high posting cost, the labor 
market is more likely to have the wage curve A. Unauthorized immigration 
brings the economy towards a new bad equilibrium characterized by lower wage 
and higher unemployment. Wage differential between migrants and natives is 
comparatively narrow and even. Whole thing reverses when the original labor 
market is given by wage curve B, where migrants improve the well-being of the 
local workers. A striking feature is that two different outcomes are induced 
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Figure 7: The Immigration Twist 
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presume the wage curve is fixed and different types of migrants may or may 
not generate the twist around the old equilibrium. As a remark, since the job 
creation condition is non-increasing, two conditions would cross only once. 
When would the twist happen? Rewrite (55)，by incorporating productivity 
difference, 
0 = 暂 (56) 
where 
tt' = TT + A^ (x^^ - bM + 0c). 
Inspecting tt' would easily spot out that (56) is similar to (55), with the 
interaction term, which only further shifts the job creation from its original 
position. 
To find the intersection, equate (39) and (56)，that is, the pre-immigration 
job creation condition and the post-one. Denote the equated market tightness 
as 0*, 
— ( # - 〜 ) . （57) 
And illegal immigration is preferential when the post-immigration (equilib-
rium) market tightness 0 > 0* • The first term inside the bracket represents the 
productivity slag in terms of bargaining power difference, where the last two 
terms in the bracket is the output gain. Intuitively, better position for employer 
help to bridge part of the productivity gap and makes firms more willing to 
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open up new positions. 
Note that the new job creation condition is decreasing with a different rate 
because market tightness changes the wage differential thus the average wage 
rate of workers. When the bargaining power of the undocumented is weak 
enough, the generated gain could compensate the productivity loss when the 
differential is sufficiently high. Therefore, it exists a critical level of market 
tightness making migrants still worthwhile to hire. 
3.3.1 A Simulation Example 
Intersection is indeed plausible given some reasonable parameter values. Nor-
malize the output of the natives to 1 and let migrant be unskilled, so they can 
only produce 60 percent of the natives, and with 80 percent reservation wage 
of the local for their living. Suppose the bargaining power of illegal immigrants 
is about 70 percents of the domestic workers, following Cahuc & Zylberberg 
(2004), let the per-period posting cost equal to 0.3, separation 0.15 and the 
matching function be m (0) = l^fd. Presuming 3 percent of the population is 
undocumented workers (see Hanson, 2006), the job creation condition can be 
described by Table 1. Prom the table, two curves intersect when the market 
tightness is about 0.7. 
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Table 1: Two Intersected Job Creation Conditions 
Tightness Wage (M = 0) Wage (M = 0.03) 
0.3 0.9836 0.9832 
0.4 0.9810 0.9807 
0.5 0.9788 0.9786 
0.6 0.9768 0.9767 
0.7 0.9749 0.9749 
0.8 0.9732 0.9733 
0.9 0.9715 0.9718 
1.0 0.9700 0.9704 
1.1 0.9685 0.9690 
1.2 0.9671 0.9677 
3.4 Immigration Controls 
The era of large scale illegal immigration from Mexico to the US could be traced 
back to the abrupt end of the Bracero Program (Orrenius, 2001). The Bracero 
Program is a guest-worker scheme aimed to cover the labor market shortage 
after the World War II. It was the US agricultural practitioner lobbied the 
government to extend the program through the 1950s until the union called for 
its end in 1964. The subsequent Immigration Reform Act of 1965 (IRA) set a 
barrier to deter the alien labors and started the first wave of illegal immigration 
control policy. 
Besides the control policies that aim to upsurge the costs of crossing the 
border illegally or lower the earnings during the tenure, the US government had 
tried to create an economic fence to alleviate the problem. The establishment of 
the Mexican Border Industrialization Program (BIP) aims to absorb the poten-
tial illegal immigrants by providing a sufficiently high remuneration (supported 
by the minimum wage law) to the labors resided around the border. At the 
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same time, trade and fiscal incentives are offered to encourage the formation of 
new assembly plants (maquiladoras) in Mexico. Rivera-Batiz (1986) brings the 
possibility of internal migration into the picture and states that the plan may 
deem to fail as workers from other regions in Mexico will flood to the border and 
boost the labor supply substantially. This in turn induces more unemployment 
and makes illegal immigration an attractive alternative. 
Rather than focusing on how well different immigration controls act in its 
primary goal of deterring illegal entry, in the remaining section, focus on the 
labor market effect of the currently implemented measures in the US. 
3.4.1 Workplace Sanction 
Since 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) set penalty to 
eliminate illegal immigrants through new workplace enforcement measures such 
as employer sanctions. The enactment of IRCA aimed to lower immigration by 
imposing fines to employers who hire illegal immigrants. Cobb-Clark, Shiells 
and Lowell (1995)'s study find that the policy lowers wage rate as it changes 
relative supply of workers and levies additional recruitment costs to employers 
who are not able to discern the type of workers perfectly. Here we focus on 
an alternative mechanism which may lower the wage of the domestic workers 
though migrants appear to benefit the natives based on the analysis in the basic 
model. Even firms may discern workers' legal status perfectly, wage of domestic 
worker could also decrease. 
Consider the sanction policy that increases the exogenous separation rate $ 
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for migrant. (48) now becomes 
_ ~ p + s ^ “ + P + sM • 
Suppose sN = s and s " = s + A, using (46), after some algebra, 
je = (p+s)7r-[p + s + aA]w^ + aXx^ 
_ (p+s) (p + s + A) • 
Note that (58) collapses to (48) when A = 0. Rewrite the job creation 
condition as 
叨N _ P + 5 ” qA 工n / p + S + X \c{p + S) 
p + s + aX p + s + a\ \p + s + aX J q (9) 
>1 
^{p + s) + aX N / p + s + A \ c ( p + s) 
二 • • • . --- — -— M.I J J^ , , I I . I•.丨 
p + s + aA \p + s + a\J q{6) 
= r 广 嘴 • 牌） 
where we let = r =《(:+,!:，and 屯 = ( 5 9 ) should be 
compared with (50); the difference is that we now have two "coefficients" in 
(59). 
What are their implications to wage and market tightness? Total differenti-
ate (59), in conjunction with dw^ = /3c dd to get 
^ _ xN 
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dwN 二 xN 
d9 ^ -{p + s)q 
d^ ~ /?g2 _ (p + s) q' 
dw^ = -/3c + 
" d F - /3g2 一屯（p + s) 〈 u. 
In other words, any increase in T is good to worker but in 屯 is detrimental. 
汪—Q (1 - n 
沉—p + s + Q!A 
d免 1 一屯 a ^ 
— = > 0 
9 入 p + s + A 
Combining, 
^ _ ^ ^ a ( 、 
+ ? - + 
dw^ _ dw^ dV dwN ( 、 
+ ? - + 
Consider three scenarios. When migrants in every aspect are identical to 
native workers, = 1 and F = 1. F plays no role in this case. If 1 — ^ 'o： < 0, 
both 煮 and ^ ^ are positive and the policy benefits local workers. Recall that 
屯 = ， 1 —屯a < 0 implies a > 1 or there is zero migrant (a = -fj^]^)-
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Immigration control policy hurts the local workers while the illegal immigrants 
do no harm to the local citizens in the first place. 
What if migrants are good? F > 1 in this circumstance. < 0, for any 
positive number of migrants,载 > 0. It follows that 黑， ^ ^ < 0. 
When migrants are bad, F < 1. 
de d6 a ( l - r ) de 1 - , 、 
— = — H (62) 
d\ dT p + s + a\ d^ p + s + X 、 ’ 
v ‘ ^ ‘ 
+ -
dwN _ dwN a ( l - r ) dwN l - ^ Q 
dX ~ dr p + s + aX 孤 p + s + x ( ) 
V ‘ ^ ‘ 
+ — 
Note that F has to be small enough to make 裝 and ^ ^ positive. Thus it 
is not always beneficial to implement immigration control even firms' instanta-
neous reaction is closing vacancies in response to the immigration flow. While 
the policy aims to make it less profitable in hiring migrants. As vacancy is 
assigned randomly to workers, the measure effectively highens the average cost 
of posting the job. 
In order to deter unlawful employment more effective, employers, who hire 
illegal worker, will be fined or sentenced. When most existing controls target 
the migrants, here we consider the demand side policy and evaluate its effect 
on the labor market. 
Upon meeting and employment, the firm risks of fining the extra r dollars. 
With probability q, the employer is caught red-handed. This transforms the 
asset equation for the occupied job to 
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pjM = X {x^ - w'' - r ) + (1 - A) (x^ - w"') + {s + X){V- j'') 
=x^ - w^' -Xr + {s + X){V- J''') 
Obviously, the only difference is that the imposed fine discounts the potential 
output of migrant, therefore impedes the overall production level of the firm. 
Diagramatically, the exploitation effect tries to change only the slope of the job 
creation condition. This inspection, nevertheless, shifts and changes the slope 
of the curve at the same time. When we add fine into the picture, the fine 
itself further shifts the job creation condition backward thus harming the labor 
market. 
3.4.2 Deportation Sc Border Patrol 
It may be argued that what the model really describes is a situation in which 
the paperless workers only become unemployed, rather than deported, when 
the state finds out the illegalities work. In reality, it is very likely that illegal 
migrants fall under this situation. 
The mandate of the United Nations High Commisioner of Refugees (UN-
HCR) is to provide international protection to refugee. The status of refugee is 
not automatically granted and has to be assessed and approved by the autho-
rized agent, like UNHCR, or the government. Though many countries have not 
signed the convention, the custom upheld by the international human right law 
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will disallow refoulement when the applications submitted by the asylum seekers 
are still pending. As a result, asylum seekers very likely work illegally for their 
survivals and without being deported at the same time. The workplace inspec-
tion falls under this category and represents the effect of illegal immigration 
when international refugee protection is provided in that particular country. 
In case where international protection is not sufficiently enforced, migrants 
will be deported. By incurring a fixed cost, migrant will returns to the host 
country and seek employment again. As stated by Chiswick (1988)，repetitive 
migration is commonly observed. With re-entering, the value enjoyed by the 
migrant in the host country is what he gained in the country of origin net of 
the cost of attempted immigration. To make the migrants indifferent, benefits 
from migration must be at least equal to the costs of emigration plus his status 
quo, so in equilibrium S" = S" + C. 
pSM = b"' + 6q (9) {W"'' - S"') + A - S^^) 
=b"' + XC + eq (9) {W''' - SM) (64) 
It is clear that with deportation, in the face of repetitive migration, depor-
tation effectively raises the reservation wage of the migrants thus weakening the 
productivity effect (i.e. lower 
What if the state elevates external enforcement at the same time, as is im-
Deportat ion works in the same way as what, happened in workplace inspection, in which 
case we was already discussed in the last sect,on. 
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plemented recently by the US government? By forcefully uplifts the spendings 
in external measures like border patrol, it highens the cost of immigration, and 
part of the increased cost of entry is transferred to the domestic employers there-
fore discourages employment. Based on this result, we may conclude that the 
immigration policy mix adopted and recently enfored by the US are deemed to 
be detrimental to its labor market, in the sense that it endangers the likelihood 
that both wage rate and employment would have been reduced. 
In short, while the negative productivity effect makes the undocumented 
migrants secondary to the native workers in production, migrants' vulnerable 
positions render them easy to be exploited and counters off, sometimes out-
weighs, the output loss. The productivity effect can be disaggregate as the 
output effect and reservation wage effect. In accounting various immigration 
control policies, for all policies that raise the separation rate, like workplace 
inspection, the domestic wage rate unavoidably goes down as average length of 
the employment is shortened, which makes the recruitment activity more costly 
to firms that are ignorant in search. External control like border patrol though 
may barely hold the flow, it would surge the reservation wage of the forsaken 
and intensifies the harm due to the unproductive migrants. Similar principle 
applies when the government imposing penality to lower the expected output of 
the new comers. 
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4 Conclusion 
The analysis in the first part extended the Hazari & Sgro (2003) model by 
incorporating the possibility of minimum wage unemployment. It is found that 
illegal immigration is detrimental to both domestic unemployment and long-run 
welfare. This cursory analysis on employment can be viewed as to identify the 
upper bound level of unemployment (quantity adjustment) that illegal migrant 
bourn on the receiving economy, in contrast to the wage adjustment analysis 
presented by the full employment literatures. The result is embedded in the 
structure of every wage rigidity model that wage level by no mean could vary 
to absorb part of the shock through the nomial adjustment. Not surprisingly, 
in the view of such rigidity, when there is not enough compensation, the welfare 
of the domestic citizens is upset. 
The second part of the analysis applies the search model to the issue of illegal 
immigration. While there is only limited study using the search model to study 
legal immigration, this section had highlighted the difference between legal and 
illegal immigrants, and systematically studied the implications of various control 
measures to the labor market of the host country, rather than evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the policies. We identified the productivity effect and exploitation 
effect that jointly determine the aggregate impact acts upon the labor market. 
Based on our model, we conclude that most immigration control policy bring 
undesirable, contracting effect to the labor market. As a remark, this simple 
model largely describes what happens in the labor market not well segregated. 
But seeing existing job assignment literature already covered the issue in this 
56 
aspect, we shall simply refer the reader to Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and 
Dolado et al (2003). 
In short, the common hostile view that illegal migrants deems to hurt the 
economy may committed to the lump of labor fallacy. If we fairly assume that 
the firms may reasonably react to the new flow of foriegn workers, the impact 
of illegal immigration could be positive or, in case where the undocumented 
workers may hurt the economy, be mild indeed. Existing immigration policy 
though in certain degree succeeds in deterring the flow of immigration from 
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